The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.
Introduction
Majority voting is one of the oldest pastimes of social choice theorists starting with Condorcet (1785). It is well known that majority voting may lead to intransivities in the social preference. This situation is often referred to as a Condorcet paradox. The evaluation of the likelihood of the Condorcet paradox under various probabilistic assumptions has been the subject of an important literature (Gehrlein (2006) , Gehrlein and Lepelley (2010) ).
The purpose of this note is to examine the likelihood of a Condorcet paradox in a specific setting. Precisely, the set of alternatives X is given by {0, 1}
k and the preferences of the voters are postulated to be separable linear orders. This setting underlies all the analysis of logrolling and vote trading in committees/legislatures (Miller (1994) ). An alternative is a sequence of k distinct bills where each bill has two possible outcomes: "passage" (1) or "defeat" (0). Separability simply means that preferences on each bundle of issues are independent of what could be decided on the remaining issues.
In that setting, there is a Condorcet winner on each individual issue. In our note, the vector whose coordinates are these local Condorcet winners is called the componentwise Condorcet winner. Of course, the componentwise Condorcet winner does not need to be a Condorcet winner. If so, by construction, any alternative dominating the componentwise Condorcet winner must differ from it on at least two coordinates. In terms of interpretation, this means that among the majority coalition of voters who have this preference, some voters will vote against their preference on a specific bill in exchange of other(s) going against their preference on some other bill(s). This arrangement is referred to as logrolling or vote trading. The equivalence between logrolling and the non-existence of a Condorcet winner has been noted my many scholars including Bernholz (1973), Kadane (1972) , Koehler (1975) , Miller (1975 Miller ( ,1977 and Schwartz (1975) 1 .
In this note, we revisit the estimation of the likelihood of a Condorcet paradox in this logrolling setting. Since the domain of admissible preferences domain is restricted, the result cannot be obtained as a corollary of existing frequency results. Precisely, we compute, for three probabilistic models, the likelihood of a Condorcet paradox (or equivalently of logrolling) when two or three bills are under scrutiny. We compare the derived frequencies with the frequencies which are obtained in the unrestricted case.
The Setting
The set of voters/Committee/legislature is denoted by N = {1, ..., n} and the set of alternatives (Hypercube) by X = {0, 1} k where k ≥ 2. Therefore the number m of alternatives is equal to 2 k . Here an alternative is a sequence of yes/no or accept/reject answers describing the decisions of the legislators/voters in the committee to a sequence of k bills/questions/pieces of legislation/issues on which they are deliberating. We assume that the preferences of the members of the committee are restricted to belong to a subset of the set of linear orders over X. Precisely, we assume that for all i ∈ N , the preference P i is a separable linear order. By separable, we mean that the following holds true. A profile of preferences is a vector P = (P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) in (LS k ) n where for all i ∈ N , P i denotes the preference of voter i. The anonymous pattern attached to P is the vector n(P) = (n 1 (P), n 2 (P), ...n ϕ(k) (P)) describing how many voters have each of the ϕ(k) conceivable separable preferences 3 . The anonymous pattern of a profile just keep track of the number of voters for each conceivable preference but forget their names. Of course:
n j (P) = n for all P ∈ (LS k )
n Given a profile P in (LS k ) n and x, y ∈ X with x ̸ = y, x majority dominates y for P if:
n j (P, x, y) > n 2 where:
n j (P, u, v) = { n j (P, u, v) if uP j v 0 if vP j u for all u, v in X, u ̸ = v and all j = 1, ..., ϕ (k)
For every P ∈ (LS k ) n , majority domination defines a strict binary relation M D(P ) over X. If n is odd, then M D(P ) is complete. It is therefore a tournament. Note however, as first pointed out by Hollard and Le Breton (1996) , that this tournament is separable in the following sense. For all a, b ∈ X and all S ⊂ {1, ..., k}, if aM D(P )b and a
We denote by T S k the set of separable tournaments 4 and by ψ(k) the number of separable tournaments over X 5 .
Given a profile P in (LS k ) n , x ∈ X is a Condorcet winner for P if for every y ∈ X, y ̸ = x, In what follows, we will make use of the following three probabilistic models over (LS k ) n .
IC (Impartial Culture) will denote the model where each profile P in (LS k ) n is drawn with equal probability. Since there are ϕ (k) m such profiles, this means that each P has a probability equal to
IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture) will denote the model where each anonymous pattern is drawn with equal probability. Since there are
) such patterns 6 , this means that each anonymous pattern has a probability equal to
. Note that strictly speaking IAC does not define a probability distribution over P. In fact, any arbitrary assignment of probabilities to specific profiles will work in the computations that follow, as long as the overall likelihood for observing each of the anonymous patterns remains the same. For example, since for each anonymous pattern n = (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n ϕ(k) ), there are
attached profiles, we could assume for instance that they are all equally likely.
ITC (Impartial Tournament Culture) 7 will denote the model where each separable tournament is drawn with equal probability. Since there are ψ (k) such tournaments 8 , this means that each tournament has a probability equal to
. As above, we can then split the probability mass attached to any tournament equally across the profiles compatible with that tournament. 4 The set of separable tournaments is the superset of separable linear orders which is obtained when we delete the transitivity requirement while keeping the separability one 5 Hollard and Le Breton (1996) have proved that every separable tournament can be obtained through majority aggregation of separable preferences if the number of voters is large enough. 6 The number of ordered decompositions of the integer n into r integers is equal to
. In our case, r is the number of separable linear orderings. 7 This wording is ours. To the best of our knowledge, there is no name for this probabilistic model. It has been used fo instance by Bell (1981) and Fey (2008) . 8 To the best of our knowledge, nor the values of the function ψ have been tabulated, neither its asymptotic behavior has been studied.
The Case k=2
When k = 2, there are 8 separable linear orders over a total of 24 linear orders. Therefore, an anonymous pattern for n voters is a 8−dimensional vector n = (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n 8 ) of integers: n 1 n 2 n 3 n 4 n 5 n 6 n 7 n 8 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) such that: n = n 1 + n 2 + ... + n 8 (0, 0) is a Condorcet winner iff:
Probability that there exists a Condorcet winner for ITC
It is straightforward to show that there are 4 tournaments for which (1, 1) is the componentwise Condorcet winner. This means that we have 16 separable tournaments (out of 9 the 2 42 = 64 tournaments). Among those, only 8 have a Condorcet winner. So, we obtain the ITC probability of having a Condorcet winner is equal to 50%.
Probability that there exists a Condorcet winner for IC
Here IC means that for each voter, the 8 possible linear orders are drawn with probability 1 8 . Therefore the distribution of the random vector n is a multinomial distribution π =
, 1 8 , ..., 1 8 ) .
From the multivariate central limit theorem, we deduce that when n is large . . .
Then, when n is large, the distribution of the 3−dimensional vector (
) is the 3−dimensional gaussian Z ≡ N (0, ∆) where: 9 The number of tournaments over m vertices is equal to 2 ( 
 
We deduce that if n is large, the probability of the event described by inequalities (1) is the the probability that Z ∈ R + . This probability is equal to:
The probability of the existence of a Condorcet winner is 4 times this number. This number 83.332% is slightly larger than the number that we obtain when there are no separability restrictions (i.e. 24 linear orders instead of 8). In that case the probability is (Garman and Kamien (1968):
] ≃ 82.45%
Probability that there exists a Condorcet winner for IAC
Here, the number of possible realizations of the integer valued random vector n is:
The IAC model assumes that all these
(n + 1) (n + 2) (n + 3) (n + 4) (n + 5) (n + 6) (n + 7) realizations are equally likely. Solving (1) amounts to counting the number of integer solutions to a system of linear inequalities. This can be done efficiently using the theory of Ehrhart's polynomials. After solving this combinatorial step, we obtain a number which has to be divided by the number above. The IAC probability of a Condorcet winner is 4 times this number.
We obtain 7(n + 5)(n + 3) 8(n + 2)(n + 6) for n odd and 7n(2n + 11)(n + 4)(n + 2) 16(n + 1)(n + 3)(n + 5)(n + 7) 10 The number of ordered decompositions of the integer n into m integers is equal to
. Here m is the number of separable linear orderings.
for n even.
For n tending to infinity, we find that the IAC probability of a Condorcet winner is 7 8 = 87.5%: this number is larger that the IAC number in the unrestricted case which is 83.84% (see Gehrlein, 2006 ).
The Case k=3
The number of alternatives is equal to 2 3 = 8. Therefore, the total number of linear orders Doing so, we obtain the following indexation of any anonymous pattern n = (n 1 , n 2 , ..., n 96 ): (1, 1, 1) on top 
(1, 0, 1) on top (1, 0, 0) on top 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 0) 
(0, 0, 0) on top (1, 1, 1) is a Condorcet winner iff the following seven inequalities hold true n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 +n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 +n 73 + n 74 + n 75 + n 76 + n 77 + n 78 + n 79 + n 80 + n 81 + n 82 + n 83 + n 84 > n 2 ; n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 21 + n 22 + n 23 + n 24 +n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 +n 61 + n 62 + n 63 + n 64 + n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 + n 69 + n 70 + n 71 + n 72 > n 2 ; n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 21 + n 22 + n 23 + n 24 +n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 +n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 53 + n 54 + n 55 + n 56 + n 57 + n 58 + n 59 + n 60 > n 2 ; n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 13 + n 14 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 +n 27 + n 28 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 +n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 +n 61 + n 62 + n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 n 75 + n 76 + n 81 + n 82 + n 83 + n 84 > n 2 ; n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 +n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 +n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 53 + n 54
n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 +n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 23 + n 24 +n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 33 + n 34 +n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 47 + n 48 +n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 57 + n 58 +n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 + n 71 + n 72 > n 2 ;
and n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 = 6.25%.
Probability that there exists a Condorcet winner for IC
Here IC means that for each voter, the 96 possible linear orders are drawn with probability , ..., 1 96 )
. From the multivariate central limit theorem, we deduce that when n is large Then, when n is large, the distribution of the 7−dimensional vector
where:
+ n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 + n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 + n 73 + n 74 + n 75 + n 76 + n 77 + n 78 + n 79 + n 80 + n 81 + n 82 + n 83 + n 84 N 2 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 21 + n 22 + n 23 + n 24 + n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 + n 61 + n 62 + n 63 + n 64 + n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 + n 69 + n 70 + n 71 + n 72 N 3 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 21 + n 22 + n 23 + n 24 + n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 + n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 53 + n 54 + n 56 + n 56 + n 57 + n 58 + n 59 + n 60 N 4 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 27 + n 28 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 + n 37 + n 38 + n 39 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 + n 61 + n 62 + n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 + n 75 + n 76 + n 81 + n 82 + n 83 + n 84 N 5 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 29 + n 30 + n 31 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 + n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 53 + n 54 + n 79 + n 80 + n 81 + n 82 + n 83 + n 84 N 6 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 21 + n 22 + n 23 + n 24 + n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 33 + n 34 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 47 + n 48 + n 49 + n 50 + n 51 + n 52 + n 57 + n 58 + n 65 + n 66 + n 67 + n 68 + n 71 + n 72 N 7 = n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 + n 5 + n 6 + n 7 + n 8 + n 9 + n 10 + n 11 + n 12 + n 13 + n 14 + n 15 + n 16 + n 17 + n 18 + n 19 + n 20 + n 22 + n 24 + n 25 + n 26 + n 27 + n 28 + n 30 + n 32 + n 33 + n 34 + n 35 + n 36 + n 38 + n 40 + n 41 + n 42 + n 43 + n 44 + n 45 + n 46 + n 47 + n 48 + n 49 + n 51 + n 65 + n 67 + n 81 + n 83 is approximatively the 7−dimensional gaussian Z ≡ N (0, ∆) where: According to Niemi and Weisberg (1968) , the probability of having a Condorcet winner when there are 8 alternatives is equal to 58.49%. Here, by using the R program the codes of which are reproduced together with one simulation output in appendix 1, we obtain with 10 6 simulations, a bootstrap of 2000 and 1000 draws, an average empirical probability equal to 0.07382304, a variance equal to 3.20618927327327 × 10 −7 and a 95% empirical confidence interval equal to [0.072654875, 0.074935125]. We deduce that the IC probablity of having a Condorcet winner is here around 0.07382304× 8 = 0.590 58 with a 95% chance of being in the interval [0.581 24, 0.599 48]. It seems that the probability is higher than in the unrestricted case but given the random estimate, we cannot claim that it holds true with probability 1.
Another approach could consist in the computation of the multiple integral expressing the orthant probability. We just provide a sketch in appendix 2.
Probability that there exists a Condorcet winner for IAC
Here, all ( n+95
95
) possible realizations of the integer valued random vector P n are assumed to be equally likely. Solving (2) amounts to count integer solutions to a system of linear inequalities. This can be done efficiently using the theory of Ehrhart's polynomials. After solving this combinatorial step, we obtain a number which has to be divided by the number above. The IAC probability of a Condorcet winner is 8 times this number.
When n tends to infinity, the probability 96−dimensional vector describing the proportions (after division by n) of voters in each of the 96 groups is the uniform law on the 96−dimensional unitary simplex. Further, the 7 inequalities describing the constraints on the proportions p i = 
The codes of the R program to compute the volume of an arbitrary polytope are described in appendix 3. Having to deal with S 96 raises a curse of dimensionality. To deal with it, we may want to exploit the symmetries of the polytope 11 . Indeed a careful inspection of these 7 inequalities show that many variables come together and can be aggregated to form new variables. The process of aggregation as well as the new variables are described in appendix 4 for the cases k = 3 and k = 2. By doing so, we move from 96 to 32 variables in the case k = 3 and from 8 to 6 variables in the case k = 2. Of course, the probability law on the lower dimensional vector is not anymore uniform. However, we show in appendix 4 that it belongs to the Dirichlet family. This parametric class of probabilities can be emulated in R programs. 12 We have performed several "bootstrap" simulations 13 . Unsurprisingly, they do not deliver really different results. For one of them, we have obtained a mean estimated volume equal to 0.074301, a variance equal to 6.99583573573574×10 −5 , and a 95% empirical confidence interval equal to [0.058975, 0.092]. We deduce that the IAC probability of having a Condorcet winner is here around 0.074301× 8 = 59.44% (quite close to the IC one) with a 95% chance of being in the interval [47.18%,
73.6%].
14 11 The idea of exploiting symmetries already appear in Schürmann (2013) . 12 The codes of the R program to compute the probability of a polytope for a Dirichlet distribution is available from the authors upon request. 13 i.e. volume estimator bootstrap(N = ..., n = 96, n par bootstrap = ..., A = A, n simu = ...).
14 As compared to IC, the bootstrap has been performed for N = 10 5 (instead of N = 10 6 simulations) with a bootstrap of 1000 (instead of 2000) and 1000 draws.
Conclusion
The computed probability values that are of primary interest from this study are summarized in Table 1 . 15 Results are most evident for the case of two issues where the degree of dependence that IAC-based assumptions are known to introduce beyond the complete independence of ICbased assumptions causes a predictable increased likelihood for observing a Condorcet winner for both the unrestricted case and when separable preferences are introduced. .59
It is particularly of interest to note that the introduction of the condition of Separable Preferences also increases the probability of observing a Condorcet winner from the unrestricted cases for both IC and IAC. So, the addition of this simple model to restrict preferences to be in accord with the logically consistent behavior of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preferences rankings to increase the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios. These probabilities all predictably decrease and trend toward a common value for the case of three issues, but the critical point is that the same patterns consistently emerge. ,k) , sep="", collapse="")){ 55 # Simulates and returns the empirical probability of one particular case 56 # n is the number of gaussians r.v. to simulate 57 # k is the size of the gaussian r.v. 58 # mu is the vector of means for the gaussian r.v., of length k, default set to 0 59 # sigma is the variance-covariance matrix for the gaussian r.v., default is identity matrix (unitary independent gaussians) 60 # case is the case that we want to study ( default is "all positive"), 61 # defined as a charcater string of 0s and 1s corresponding to the components of the gaussian r.v. which are negative/positive 62 # ex : for k=4, case ="0001" means that every component except the last one is negative 63 # so default is coded to be "11... 78 # We are only interested in one case, we get the empirical mean of this case appearing and the job's done ! 79 y ¡-mean(codes == case) 80 print (paste ("empirical probability of case", case, "is :", y)) 81 return (y) 82 } 83 84 simulation parallel ¡-function (n par simu, k, n simu =100, mimax = c(0, 1), mu=rep(0,k), sigma = diag(k), 85 case = paste (rep(1,k), sep="", collapse="")){ 86 # simulation one can get pretty slow if n is too big 87 # This function overcomes this by computing in parallel several instances of simulation one with a smaller n 88 # n simu is the number of instances of simulation that we compute 89 # n par simu is the number of gaussians that we simulate in each instance 90 # In total, we simulate n par simu*n simu gaussians 91 # The fact that we get an estimate of our probability for each instance means that we can build empirical confidence intervals 92 #and compute the varaince of our estimate 93 # also the argument minmax corresponds to a range we want to know the probability for our estimate to be into 94 # default is (0,1) so the empirical probability will be 1, you can change 127 # This avoids having to simulate a lot of gaussian r.v. 128 # n is the number of gaussian r.v. to simulate 129 # n simu is the number of bootstraped samples that we'll use 130 # n par bootstraped is the size of each bootstraped sample 131 # The fact that we get an estimate of our probbaility for each instance means that we can build empirical confidence intervals 132 # and compute the variance of our estimate 133 # also the argument minmax corresponds to a range we want to know the probability of our estimate to be into 134 # default is (0,1) so the empirical probability will be 1, you can change 183 # simulation bootstrap should be faster than simulation parallel in general because we tend to simulate less gaussian r.v. for the bootstrap 184 # Also bootstraping reduces variance for the same bias (0 here) in theory 185 # However, bootstraping in practice can be tricky when you want to estimate a case where probability is low : 186 # The chance of getting the case when simulating the r.v. is low and the the chance of getting that case when bootstraping is also low 187 # Therefore you should use simulation bootstrap when you'are estimating a probability which you think is high, simulation parallel otherwise 188 189
Appendix 2: The Exact Orthant Probability for IC and k = 3
Consider a 7-dimensional gaussian vector X with zero mean and matrice of variance-covariance ∆ defined as follows: We derive: 
is equal to: h(x, A,b) 51 # This avoids having to simulate a lot of simplex points 52 # N is the number of points to simulate 53 # n is the dimension of the space 54 # n simu is the number of bootstraped samples that we'll use 55 # n par bootstraped is the size of each bootstraped sample 56 # The fact thatwe get an estimate of our voume for each instance means that we can build empirical confidence intervals 57 # and compute the variance of our estimate 58 # also the argument minmax corresponds to a range we want to know the probability of our estimate to be into 59 # default is (0,1) so the empirical probability will be 1 , you can change it to get different probabilities 60 # A and b are the same as before 61
Appendix 4 : Moving from Uniform to Dirichlet. How to deal with the Curse of Dimensionality
Let S m be the m−dimensional unit simplex i.e. the set of vectors p in R such that:
The uniform distribution on S m is a special case of a Dirichlet distribution. The Dirichlet distribution of order m with parameters α 1 , ..., α m > 0 has a probability density function with respect to Lebesgue measure defined by :
with 16 : From the aggregation property, since the vector p follows a Dirichlet distribution of order 96 with parameter (1, 1, 1, ..., 1) , we deduce that the vector q follows a Dirichlet distribution of order 32 with parameters: α = (12, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 12) So, we have moved from 96 dimensions to 32 dimensions but at the cost of moving from a simple Dirichlet (the uniform) to a more sophisticated one. The 7 inequalities with the 32 variables write as follows. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 
We can move to 6 new variables:
The system of equations writes now:
The matrix and right-hand side are now:  is the same as the probability of being in H when p is drawn uniformly over S 8 .
